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IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE ANTITRUST
LAWS
RICHARD ALAN ARNOLD*
Too often those who have suffered economic harm as the result
of anticompetitive conduct by antitrust violators go uncompen-
sated. A literal reading of the private remedy section of the antitrust
laws portends a different result. Section 4 of the Clayton Act pro-
vides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained "
This language leaves little doubt that Congress intended to pro-
vide, without limitation, a cause of action to "any person" who is
"injured in his business or property" by an antitrust violation.2
With rare exceptions,3 the federal courts consistently have inter-
preted standing to bring a private cause of action under the anti-
trust laws4 more narrowly than its literal language suggests. Using
the rubrics of "direct injury" 5 or "target area,"" the federal courts
have left numerous classes of persons injured by antitrust violations
without an effective private remedy I Despite recoguizing both the
compensatory and deterrent role of the private cause of action, ' the
United States Supreme Court repeatedly has allowed various limi-
* B.S., East Tennessee State University; J.D., University of South Carolina; LL.M., Uni-
versity of Illinois. Attorney, Kenny, Nachwalter & Seymour P.A., Miami, Florida.
1. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
2. Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1977).
3. The cases that have attempted to give § 4 of the Clayton Act its broadest possible
interpretation have been based on either a literal reading of the statute, e.g., Vines v. General
Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.) (quoting language of
§ 4 as unambiguous in giving "any person" injured by antitrust violation a right of action),
or a misapplication of the law of standing. E.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142,
1151 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying the Administrative Procedures Act "zone of interest" test).
4. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970), defines antitrust laws as used under
§ 4 of the Clayton Act. These laws include the Sherman Act, the Wilson Tariff Act, and the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.
5. See notes 36-39 infra & accompanying text.
6. See notes 40-45 tnfra & accompanying text.
7. Some commentators believe that not every injury resulting from an antitrust violation
should be compensated. See, e.g., Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries,
89 HARv. L. REV. 1127 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977); Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
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tations on section 4 to go unreviewed
In recent years, the decisions of Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois,'0
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.," and Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co. of California'2 have cast further doubt on the Supreme
Court's commitment to providing a broad private remedy as an
intricate part of the nation's antitrust policies.'3 The source of this
judicial restraint is fear of ruinous or windfall recoveries, which can
be a side effect of a literal reading of section 4.14 In the recent case
of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., ' 5 Justice Black-
mun's dissent from the majority opinion allowing a private antitrust
action against municipalities graphically illustrated the concern
over the ruinous effect of treble damages. The basis of Justice
Blackmun's dissent was the inflexible language of section 4 of the
Clayton Act mandating recovery of treble damages.'6
The conflict between the broad language of section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act, with its dual compensatory and deterrent roles, and the
judicial reluctance to give broad-scale application to the treble
9. The courts of appeal have been virtually unfettered in their attempt to limit antitrust
private remedies. For example, in Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), the Second
Circuit noted,
In a series of decisions over the last 15 years, in all of which certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court, this court has committed itself to the principle
that in order to have "standing" to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act, a person must be within the "target area" of the alleged antitrust
conspiracy
Id. at 1295.
10. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
11. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
12. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975); Calderone
Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51,
54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). The Supreme Court's recent decision,
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979), is perhaps a softening of the restrictive trend.
In Reiter, the Court held that the "business or property" limitation in § 4 of the Clayton Act
must be read in the disjunctive. The Court allowed consumers the right to sue for damage to
"property" without requiring that the injury be commerical in nature.
14. Concern over the ruinous propensities of the treble damage remedy has caused one
commentator to suggest, contrary to the clear language of § 4, that under certain limited
circumstances federal courts have the discretion not to award treble damages. Ross,
Recognizing the Reliance Interest in Awarding Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act:
Of Mitigation and Prospectivity, 12 GA. L. REv. 193 (1978).
15. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
16. Id. at 442-43.
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damage remedy has produced great confusion over who may recover
for antitrust violations. 7 The purpose of this Article is neither to
reconcile the various decisions under section 4 of the Clayton Act
nor to offer suggestions for analysis under the statutory private rem-
edy 18 Rather, this Article suggests that the judiciary can reconcile,
within existing legal doctrine, the internal conflicts between the two
valid public policies reflected by the broad private remedy contem-
plated by Congress in passing section 4 of the Clayton Act and the
judicial trepidation over the possibility of ruinous windfall treble
damages. The judicially created doctrine of implication provides an
analytical framework whereby the judiciary can fashion a compen-
satory remedy that provides the victims of antitrust violations with
a viable remedy, further deters antitrust violators, and reduces the
risk of ruinous recoveries. The thesis of this Article is that an im-
plied remedy for actual compensatory damages exists for any person
injured by antitrust violations.
PRIVATE ANTITRUST REMEDIES - AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE
Before consideration of the availability of an implied remedy, an
examination of the scope of the existing express remedy for viola-
tions of the antitrust laws is necessary 11 The antitrust laws of the
United States proscribe various anticompetitive activities and pro-
vide a private remedy for their violation." Despite its promise, this
express private remedy fails to provide an expansive tool for com-
pensating persons injured by reason of antitrust violations while
further deterring antitrust violations. To understand the extent of
this failure, the legislative history of the antitrust laws and the
17. Numerous articles have analyzed conflicting antitrust standing decisions. See, e.g.,
Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALe L.J. 809 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Berger & Bernstein]; Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Determination of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust
Violation, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 795 (1976); Note, Standing to Sue inPrivateAntitrustLitigation:
Circuits in Conflict, 10 INDIANA L. REv. 532 (1977).
18. For such a discussion, see Berger & Bernstein, supra note 17, at 858-65.
19. The antitrust laws referred to in § 4 of the Clayton Act include §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27
of title 15 of the United States Code. See note 4 supra.
20. Private litigants have remedies available for both damages, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), and
equitable relief, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (as amended 1976). This Article focuses on damages; an
examination of standing to maintain an action for equitable relief, however, offers a basis for
comparison of the influence the prospect of treble damages has had on courts determining
standing. See notes 78-91 mnfra & accompanying text.
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private remedy in particular must be reviewed and compared with
the limitations the courts have placed on the remedy
Legislative History
Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits recovery by "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws." The predecessor to section 4 of the
Clayton Act was section 7 of the Sherman Act, which provided for
private actions under the Sherman Act only The effect of the Clay-
ton Act was to reenact section 7 to include all the antitrust laws.',
Neither the legislative history of section 7 of the Sherman Act nor
section 4 of the Clayton Act reveals any standing limitation. Senator
Sherman originally introduced the Sherman Act on August 4, 1888.
In a week-long debate in March 1890, Senator Sherman stated,
"The section of the bill provides that any person or corporation
injured or damnified by such a combination may sue for and recover
in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, of any
person or corporation a party to such combination, all damages
sustained by him." 2 In the words of Senator Sherman, the purpose
of this section was "to give to private parties a remedy for personal
injury caused by such a combination." Although the legislative
history is relatively sparse, the record is replete with statements
supporting a broad antitrust remedy Congress intended that the
private antitrust remedy be "available to the people."'24 The same
intentions were manifest in 1914 when Congress considered section
4 of the Clayton Act. Section 4 was intended to open "the door of
Justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who
violate the antitrust laws. ' 25
The legislative history further reveals that the intent of both sec-
tion 7 of the Sherman Act and its successor, section 4 of the Clayton
Act, was to serve two equally important functions: compensation to
persons injured by antitrust violations26 and deterrence of antitrust
21. Congress repealed § 7 of the Sherman Act in 1955 as superfluous. Act of July 7, 1955,
ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.
22. 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3146 (remarks of Sen. Reagan).
25. 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb).
26. 21 CONG. REC. 1767-68, 3146 (remarks of Sen. George).
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violators." These functions indicate that Congress intended to pro-
vide a broad remedy , If antitrust victims are denied a broad rem-
edy, the courts have found no justification for such denials in the
legislative history
Section 4 - Who Can Sue?
The private antitrust remedy has not been as free of limitations
as its legislative history indicates it should be. The courts have em-
ployed two major methods to limit the private antitrust remedy-
standing and the indirect purchaser doctrine .2 This Article focuses
primarily on the standing limitation, which has developed under the
negative influence of the treble damage provision." The indirect
purchaser doctrine, firmly advanced by the Supreme Court in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,3' has been rationalized as a means to
avoid complex litigation, 2 prevent duplicative recoveries, 33 limit di-
lution of the plaintiff's incentive to maintain private litigation,34
and avoid overburdening the courts.3 5 To the extent these concerns
can be reconciled with the strong compensatory policies of the anti-
trust laws, the indirect purchaser doctrine is also discussed.
Standing Analysts Under Section 4
From the beginning, the federal courts attempted to develop an
analysis that would narrow the broad language of section 4. In the
seminal standing case, Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,3" the Third
27. Id. at 2571 (remarks of Sen. Hiscock).
28. The compensation role clearly is compelling support for a broad antitrust remedy.
Deterrence also mandates a broad antitrust remedy; too broad a remedy, however, may
discourage the more directly injured plaintiffs by reducing recovery amounts and destroying
incentive.
29. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the Supreme Court held that only
persons who dealt directly with an antitrust violator are entitled to sue that violator for
antitrust damages. The Court held that "the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in
the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or property'
within the meaning of [section 4 of the Clayton Act]." Id. at 729.
30. This analysis centers on those whom the courts have denied the express private remedy
rather than on those who have been able to maintain a private action. For an exhaustive
critique of the law of standing under § 4, see Berger & Bernstein, supra note 17.
31. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
32. Id. at 732.
33. Id. at 731.
34. Id. at 745.
35. Id. at 740.
36. 183 F 704 (3d Cir. 1910). Although some courts have regarded this case as the seminal
1979]
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Circuit first introduced the "direct injury" analysis of standing. In
Loeb, the plaintiff was a stockholder and creditor of a photographic
supply company that Eastman Kodak allegedly ruined. The court
denied the plaintiff standing and noted that "it is manifest that the
plaintiff did not receive any direct injury from the alleged illegal
acts of the defendant. 3 7 The court characterized the plaintiff's al-
leged injury as "indirect, remote, and consequential. ' 3s Although
avoidance of duplicative recovery appeared to be the court's motiva-
tion for formulating the direct injury test, other courts readily
adopted the test and extended it to deny relief to all but those who
could be characterized as immediate antitrust victims.3 9
Some courts, apparently dissatisfied with the direct injury analy-
sis, adopted an analysis that ascertained whether the plaintiff was
within the "target area"" of the antitrust violation. That label first
appeared in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,41 a Ninth Circuit
decision. The Second Circuit adopted the same analysis in
Calderone Enterprises Corp. v United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc.42 The court in Karseal allowed the plaintiff standing; but in
Calderone the Second Circuit denied standing to a nonoperating
landlord of motion picture theatres to maintain an action for con-
spiracy against certain theatre operators and movie exhibitors. In
denying the landlord standing as not being in the target area, the
court stated as follows:
standing case, see, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975),
an earlier decision on standing was Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F 820 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1909). This case was decided under § 7 of the Sherman Act. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §
7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (repealed 1955).
37. 183 F at 709 (emphasis supplied).
38. Id.
39. This statement could not have been made with any certitude until the 1950's. A line
of pre-1950 cases analyzed standing with reference to the "by reason of" language of § 4
without any reference to "the direct injury" requirement. E.g., D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn
Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 173-75 (1915); Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 133 F.2d 101, 103 (8th Cir. 1942); Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 80 F Supp.
800, 805 (D. Del. 1948). In a series of cases in the 1950's the courts removed any doubts about
application of the direct injury requirement as a standing doctrine. Bookout v. Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 294-95 (2d Cir. 1958); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods.
Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Conference of Studio
Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
40. Two commentators have labeled the "target area" test as another species of the direct
injury test. Berger .& Bernstein, supra note 17, at 830.
41. 221 F.2d 358, 364-65 (9th Cir. 1955).
42. 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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[T]o have "standing" to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act, a person must be within the "target area" of the
alleged antitrust conspiracy, i.e., a person against whom the con-
spiracy was aimed, such as a competitor of the persons sued.
Accordingly we have drawn a line excluding those who have suf-
fered economic damage by virtue of their relationships with
"targets" or with participants in an alleged antitrust conspiracy,
rather than by being "targets" themselves."
The rationale for this standing analysis was that damages sustained
by nontargets are "usually much more speculative and difficult to
prove" than those suffered by immediate antitrust victims.44 To
avoid entangling judges and juries in a morass of speculative dam-
ages this "reasonable and easily identifiable cutoff"4 was necessary.
Other variations on the theme of these two tests exist;41 whatever
the analysis, however, one thing is clear: Courts dismiss a large
number of antitrust cases on the basis of standing. 47 When one real-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1296. The court used the "enormous expansion of potential treble damage liabil-
ity" as a second reason for this analysis. Id. at 1295. Interestingly, both reasons offered for
the target area analysis also are applicable to the direct injury test.
46. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has added a "foreseeability" factor to the target area
test. See, e.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 923 (1971).
47. See, e.g., First Circuit: Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F Supp. 299,
302-03 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curam, 242 F.2d 758 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
Second Circuit: Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v.
Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974); GAF
Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 759 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 901 (1973);
Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Fields Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp,
432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); Billy Baxter,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187-89 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923
(1971); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 943 (1969); Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir.
1958); Productive Interventions, Inc. v. Trco Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,786 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); W.T.
Grant Co. v. Christensen, 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kemp Pontiac-
Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Auto. Dealers' Ass'n, Inc., 380 F Supp. 1382, 1386-88 (D. Conn.
1974); Raubal v. Engelhard Minerals & Chem. Corp., 364 F Supp. 1352, 1355-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Hans Hansen Welding Co. v. American Ship Bldg. Co., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 74,739
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Bywater v. Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cas. 73,759, at
91,202-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F Supp. 319, 321
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izes that the disposition of a case on the standing issue ensures that
the actual merits of that case are not reached, the restrictive stand-
ing analysis is distressing. Persons injured by violations of the anti-
trust laws go uncompensated despite the relatively clear legislative
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F Supp. 685, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), aff'd on other grounds, 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964).
Third Circuit: Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971); Ash v. International Business Machs., Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956); Wolfson v. Artisans Bank, 428 F Supp. 1315 (D. Del. 1977);
Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,373 (M.D. Pa. 1975);
Minersville Coal Co. v. Anthracite Export Ass'n, 335 F Supp. 360, 362-66 (M.D. Pa. 1971);
Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F Supp. 312, 316-17 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd per
curtain, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
Fifth Circuit: Universal Brands, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 546 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1977);
Tugboat, Inc. v Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); Jeffrey v. Southwestern
Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F Supp. 451 (N.D.
Tex. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Pilla v American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1976); Harsh v.
CPC Int'l Inc., 395 F Supp. 578 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Southern Concrete Co. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 F Supp. 362, 367-71, 376-78 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affl'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Campo v. National Football League, 334 F Supp.
1181, 1184-85 (E.D. La. 1971).
Sixth Circuit: Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Vermillion Foam Prods. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 386 F
Supp. 255, 259-60 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Searer v. West Mich. Telecasters, Inc., 381 F Supp.
634, 640-43 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Zenith Vinyl Fabrics Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 357 F Supp.
133 (E.D. Mich. 1973), affld, No. 73-1537 (6th Cir. June 6, 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967
(1974); Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. B.F Goodrich Co., 325 F Supp. 917 (N.D. Ohio 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1971).
Seventh Circuit: Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564, 567
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963); Amerace Corp. v. USM Corp., 1975-1 Trade
Case. T 60,255 (N.D. Ill. 1975); J.O. Pollack Co. v. L.G. Balfour Co., 1973-1 Trade Cas.
74,339, at 93,592 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Eighth Circuit: Ragar v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 388 F Supp. 1184, 1186-87 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd
per curiam, 521 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1975).
Ninth Circuit: Contreras v Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n, 484 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125-
31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Pandola v. Texaco Inc., 1975-1 Trade Cas.
60,232 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Webber v. Shell Oil Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,215 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v National Hockey League, 379 F Supp. 966, 971-72 (C.D. Cal.
1974); Southern Cal. Testing Lab., Inc. v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 1973-2 Trade Cas.
74,678, at 94,972 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Tenth Circuit: Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 938 (1973); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos.,
382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
D.C. Circuit: Council for the Advancement of the Psychological Professions & Sciences,
Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 383 F Supp. 984 (D.D.C. 1974); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l
Training School, 367 F Supp. 536, 537-40 (D.D.C. 1973).
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history indicating a contrary result."
Attempting to apply these tests, courts have denied standing
to corporate creditors,49 general partners, 0 shareholders suing m
their own right,5' lessors,52 suppliers, 3 employees," patentees,55
and franchisors.5 Apparently, the courts are uncomfortable with
these limitations. Some courts have granted standing to sup-
pliers, 57 lessors, and employees 59 under circumstances m which
they have denied standing to others. Although these cases are logi-
cally irreconcilable, they are explainable when viewed as the conse-
quence of vigorous application of judicial realism. The courts fear
the potentially negative effects of a widespread application of treble
damage actions. A combination of the enticement of a recovery
thrice one's provable damages and the possibility of ruinous verdicts
has caused the courts to develop tortured analysis of what is a clear,
straightforward statutory remedy
Fear of Treble Damages
No clearly enunciated judicial proclamation declares that the tre-
ble damage provision is the primary reason the federal courts have
narrowed the standing requirement under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. Rather, the conclusive evidence must be gleaned in a more
subtle manner. This evidence lies buried in the Act, in the tradi-
48. See notes 21-28 supra & accompanying text.
49. E.g., Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1957).
50. E.g., Coast v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
51. E.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 426 U.S.
935 (1976).
52. E.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's Inc.,
234 F.2d 518, 519 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 352 U.S. 890 (1956).
53. E.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Frye Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962),
cert. dented, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
54. Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 411 U.S. 938
(1973).
55. E.g., SCM v. Radio Corp. of America, 276 F Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affl'd, 407
F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
56. E.g., Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d
925 (10th Cir. 1967).
57. Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
The plaintiff in this case was a supplier and competitor. The court apparently granted
standing on the basis of the plaintiff's competitor status.
58. E.g., Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
59. Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tional judicial reluctance to impose punitive damages as a matter
of course, and in the case law
The treble damage feature of the Clayton Act creates an incon-
sistency in the express legislative history of the private remedy
Despite apparent equal emphasis on the twin roles of compensation
and deterrence in the legislative history, Congress virtually insured
that the primary focus by the courts in private antitrust cases would
be on deterrence by providing that an antitrust victim recover three-
fold its provable damages. The provision for treble damages requires
that two-thirds of every antitrust award in private actions be puni-
tive in nature." These punitive damages are closely analogous to
punitive damages in general tort law, which are often criticized as
producing a windfall for the plaintiff."' Because punitive damages
are a windfall, they generally are not recoverable except in the exer-
cise of the sound discretion of the jury 62 This jury discretion is
unavailable in antitrust cases. Indeed, in most circuits the jury is
not informed of the trebling provision. "3 The mandatory aspect of
the trebling provision magnifies the general judicial concern over
the windfall benefits of punitive damages and its alter ego, ruinous
judgments .64
The federal courts occasionally have acknowledged that the
spectre of treble damages has influenced their interpretation of who
can maintain an action under section 4 of the Clayton Act." In Ames
60. E.g., Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945). But
see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) (indicating
treble damages intended to be punitive in part but also to encourage litigation).
61. W PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRrs § 2, at 13 (4th ed. 1971).
62. Id. at 13-14.
63. See, e.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 955 (5th Cir. 1975);
Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1370 (10th Cir. 1972). Contra, Bordonaro
Bros. Theaters, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 203 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1953).
64. The concern over windfall recoveries is part of the same general concern over ruinous
judgments. The former focuses on an undeserved benefit to the plaintiff; the latter focuses
on an undeserved detriment to the defendant. The courts rarely have attempted to articulate
the reasons for the narrowed construction of the antitrust remedy so virtually no analytical
distinction has been made between the effect of windfall recoveries or ruinous judgments on
the decisions narrowing the private antitrust remedy.
65. Congress apparently was not concerned over the ruinous nature of the treble damage
provision. Senator Sherman's original proposal was for double damage recovery, but the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill out of committee with a treble damage remedy.
Compare 21 CONG. REc. 2901 (bill containing treble damage provision) with id. at 2455 (earlier
version of this bill with double damage provision).
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v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,6" a federal district judge
first expressed the concern that implicitly has been responsible for
limitations on the private antitrust remedy In Ames, the plaintiff
stockholder alleged that an illegal acquisition of the company by the
defendant rendered his stock worthless. The district court denied
the stockholder standing because his injury would be duplicative of
any injury sustained by the company" and stated that a contrary
result would "subject the defendant not merely to treble damages,
but to sextuple damages, for the same unlawful act."68 Despite this
early reference to the dire consequences of the treble damage provi-
sion, direct references to this concern in subsequent reported deci-
sions have been infrequent.
In Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc.,"5 the Second Circuit denied standing to a nonoperating land-
lord of motion picture theatres to maintain a private antitrust ac-
tion against certain motion picture distributors and exhibitors. In
holding the plaintiff outside the target area"0 of the alleged conspir-
acy, the court explained why it chose to ignore the broad language
of section 4 of the Clayton Act as follows:
[I]f the flood-gates were opened to permit treble damage suits
by every creditor stockholder, employee, subcontractor, or sup-
plier of goods and services that might be affected, the lure of a
treble recovery, implemented by the availability of the class suit
as facilitated by the amendment of Rule 23 F.R.C.P., would re-
sult in an over-kill, due to an enlargement of the private weapon
to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by Congress."
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell,72 denied
telephone subscribers standing to sue for damages from an alleged
conspiracy between the telephone company and two of its subsidiar-
ies. The court believed that a limitation on those who could sue
66. 166 F 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). This case was decided under § 7 of the Sherman Act.
67. General corporate law also explains the court's analysis. Traditional corporate law
doctrine holds that only the corporation and not its stockholders may sue for injury to the
corporation. 13 W FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5910-5911
(rev. perm. ed' 1975).
68. 166 F at 823.
69. 454 F. d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). See note 42 supra.
70. Target area is the rubric for one of several antitrust standing tests. See notes 42-43
supra & accompanying text.
71. 454 F.2d at 1295.
72. 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975).
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under section 4 was justified to ensure "against potentially disas-
trous recoveries by those only tenuously hurt."7
Another insight into the federal judiciary's concern over the po-
tential effects of the treble damage provision is found in the recent
Supreme Court case, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.7 4 The Court apparently was so concerned about the onerous
effect of the treble damage remedy that it implied single damages
might be permitted in cases in which municipalities were found
liable.75 Justice Blackmun's dissent further underscored the Court's
concern over the treble damage remedy The exclusive rationale of
Blackmun's dissent was the concern over making "governmental
units potentially liable for massive treble damages" 76 in light of the
"magnitude of the treble damages remedy provided by the antitrust
laws."77 Justice Blackmun would have had the Court refuse to ex-
tend antitrust liability to municipalities engaged in clearly
"proprietary" activities solely because of the potentially large ver-
dicts available under the existing antitrust remedy
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the intimidating influence the
treble damage provision has had on the federal courts' interpreta-
tion of section 4 of the Clayton Act comes from a comparative analy-
sis of the judicially interpreted standing requirements for a private
litigant seeking injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton
Act 78 and the standing requirements under section 4. This compari-
son offers a controlled experiment in which the only significant ana-
lytical difference between the two sections is the treble damage
provision.
Several courts have interpreted the standing requirement under
section 16 to be much broader than the requirement under section
4.7 Little support for this distinction exists in the legislative history
73. Id. at 1131.
74. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
75. In leaving open the question of single damages against municipalities, the Court stated,
"But those cases do not necessarily require the conclusion that remedies appropriate to
redress violations by private corporations would be equally appropriate for municipalities; nor
need we decide any question of remedy in this case." Id. at 401-02.
76. Id. at 442.
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). This section provides, "Any person shall be entitled to sue
for and have injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws "
79. E.g., Universal Brands, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 546 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir. 1977).
Under § 16, the plaintiff need only show injury or threatened injury proximately caused by
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of the two acts,"0 and the primary reason for the differing interpreta-
tions is the absence of treble damages under section 16.81 In In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution,8" the Ninth Circuit felt that the
distinction between the two sections was justified: "In contrast to
section 4, section 16 does not involve punitive and potentially disas-
trous judgments for treble damages and attorneys- fees." Likewise,
the Fifth Circuit rationalized a broader standing requirement for
injunctive relief in Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell" by noting "Section
16 carries none of the risk of potentially disastrous monetary judg-
ments or duplicative recoveries."" Despite language differences be-
tween section 5 and section 16 that arguably could justify different
standing requirements, 6 these courts still felt obliged to base
broader standing under section 16 on the lack of the treble damage
provision.
The federal courts have expressed strong reservations over provid-
ing a broad standing requirement for section 4. Courts have denied
standing because recovery was thought to be speculative," ruinous,U
duplicative, 8 or a windfall. 0 Although different policy reasons un-
derlie concern over the various results identified by these labels,"
the defendant. But see Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269, 1274
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 ( 1976) (target area test applicable to §§ 4 and
16).
80. See Malina, The Second Circuit Review, 1973-74 Term: Antitrust, 41 BRooKLYN L. REv.
889, 889-95 (1975).
81. Some courts have based their findings of different standing requirements on language
differences in the two sections. E.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260-64 (1972).
82. 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
83. Id. at 130.
84. 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975).
85. Id. at 1132.
86. See note 81 supra.
87. E.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied., 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
88. Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Calderone Enterprises
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 930 (1972).
89. E.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-64 (1972).
90. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d at 1295-
96.
91. The policy against duplicative recoveries, for example, stems from the traditional
prohibition against double recovery for the same injury. The concern over ruinous recoveries
is founded on the fear that nonduplicative recoveries would be so numerous that when tre-
bled, the judgment would result in overkill. E.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d at
1131.
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the one common denominator in each case is the treble damage
provision. Courts apparently are convinced these adverse results
would be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, by curtailment of the
treble damage provision.
Illinois Brick Limitation
In addition to the narrowed standing requirements, the Supreme
Court established another major limitation to section 4 in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois.9" The Illinois Brick doctrine disallows indirect
purchasers the opportunity to prove the impact of an antitrust vio-
lation and effectively eliminates consumers as beneficiaries of the
express private antitrust remedy 11 This has broad implications for
the nation's antitrust policy Perhaps twenty-five percent of the
total private treble damage cases since 1960 involved only indirect
purchasers, and fully two-thirds of the cases partially involved indi-
rect purchasers. 4 Even the deterrence aspect of the express private
antitrust remedy is hampered by the Illinois Brick decision.
Before Illinois Brick the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized
the two broad purposes of section 4: compensation 5 and deter-
rence. 6 Numerous Supreme Court decisions underscored the broad
nature of the private antitrust remedy 11 Although the Supreme
Court never has embraced expressly the restrictive standing tests of
the lower courts,9" it has found other ways to narrow the broad anti-
92. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See note 29 supra.
93. Id. at 748-50, 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Proposed Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 300 Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1979) (testimony of Barry Bosworth,
Staff Director of the President's Council on Wage and Price Stability).
95. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (treble
damage provisions designed primarily as a remedy).
96. E.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
97. E.g., Reiter v. Sonotone, 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979). In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948), the Court held that "[slection 4] does
not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers.
The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of
the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."
98. Some courts, however, have interpreted the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari as
approval of the standing limitations. E.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). The
Supreme Court has couched the limitations placed on § 4 in terms of type of damages rather
than standing. Illinois Brick, for example, was not a standing decision but rather a determina-
tion of the type of proof acceptable under § 4. 431 U.S. at 729. See also Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (proof of lost profits as a result of acquiring
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trust remedy The most recent and most devastating of those meth-
ods was Illinois Brick.
Illinois Brick reflects the Court's concern over the potentially dis-
astrous consequences of widespread application of the treble dam-
age remedy 1 In light of the history of antitrust litigation before
Illinois Brick, 1oo these concerns seem more theoretical than real and
hardly seem to justify the Court's departure from the clear language
and legislative history of section 4.101 The decision has triggered a
strong legislative effort to repeal it. ' "' With the future of the legisla-
tion uncertain, perhaps the judiciary can solve the problem consis-
tent with the holding in Illinois Brick through the use of an implied
remedy for compensatory damages.
AN IMPLIED REMEDY UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that federal courts
have construed narrowly the express private antitrust remedy pro-
vided by section 4. This limitation is clearly narrower than either
the language of section 4 or its legislative history permits. A major
defendant and not allowing acquired companies to fold is not sufficient "injury" under § 4).
Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone, 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979) (holding that consumer whose money has been
diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been injured in his "property" within
meaning of § 4).
99. See notes 31-35 supra.
100. See note 94 supra. In addition to the volume of litigation filed by indirect purchasers,
indirect purchasers arguably have more incentive because of their lack of concern with ongo-
ing business relationships, which permeate the supplier-middleman relationship. In the tetra-
cycline litigation that resulted in a $250,000,000 settlement, for example, indirect purchasers,
not the directly purchasing pharmacists, provided the major impetus. This is not surprising
when one considers the following statement by a pharmacist-middleman cited by the district
court in West Va. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affl'd, 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971):
Any pharmacy claiming damages is, m my opinion, guilty of lying. All pharma-
cies base their retail prices for drugs on their costs, either using a fixed percen-
tage or a professional fee. Either way, they do not suffer damages due to higher
wholesale costs of these drugs. If anyone has a complaint, it would be the
individual consumer, not the pharmacists.
Id. at 746.
101. The Court apparently ignored the recent legislative intent expressed in passage of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976)). The Senate report on the bill specifically described the
legislation as "the legislative response to the restrictive judicial interpretations of rights
of consumers and States to recover damages under section 4." S. REP. No. 94-803, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 40-41 & n.2 (1976).
102. See Proposed Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979, supra note 94.
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motivation for this judicial restraint is the treble damage provision
of section 4. The result has been that the compensatory function of
the antitrust laws has been thwarted, and many of those who have
been injured by antitrust violations have been left without a rem-
edy
Many have suggested legislative reform to correct at least part of
the problem. The Supreme Court even hinted at a single damage
remedy by judicial fiat m City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., ' but a more traditional judicial solution can be found.
The Doctrine of Implication
The doctrine of implication is a creation of the judiciary whereby
a private right of action is implied from a statute that makes no
provision for one.104 Implication, which originated in English juris-
prudence,,' first was adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Texas & Pac. Ry v. Rigsby 101 The Supreme Court, in a simplified
definition, set forth the basis for implication of remedies: "A disre-
gard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party
in default is implied."'0 7 The Supreme Court noted that the doctrine
of implication is nothing more than application of the maxim ubt
jus ibt remedium. ,0s This means that where there is a right, there is
a remedy The maxim has broader application than the doctrine of
implication. The federal courts have used this maxim to fashion an
appropriate remedy in numerous activities not normally suitable for
103. 438 U.S. 389 (1978).
104. Implied private rights of action can be for declaratory, injunctive, or damage reme-
dies. This Article examines implied rights of action for damages. Except to the extent it
contributes to the understanding of implied actions for damages, analysis of cases involving
exclusively declaratory or injunctive relief is omitted. An implied private remedy may be
more likely when prospective relief is sought instead of damages. E.g., Farmland Indus., Inc.
v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F Supp. 670, 679 (D. Neb. 1972).
105. Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). The present efficaciousness of the
remedy in England is in doubt. See Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of
Tort, 23 MoD. L. Rv. 233 (1960).
106. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). This case implied a private remedy for violation of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act. Later decisions removed the remedy under that statute. E.g., Crane
v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry., 395 U.S. 164 (1969).
107. 241 U.S. at 39.
108. Id.
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the judiciary "I Ub jus ibi remedium was formulated in the more
sophisticated stage of a later trend of jurisprudence that empha-
sized the classification of substantive rights and creation of appro-
priate remedies to enforce them."' One method of creating an ap-
propriate remedy, implying a private right of action from a statuto-
rily created duty, is the basis for the doctrine of implication.
The justification for implication as a component of judicial activ-
ism is that the judiciary is in a better position to determine the need
for an implied remedy than the legislature was at the time of enact-
ment.'" The major rationale for implication of private remedies is
that when society labels certain behavior as bad, those who violate
that standard" should be held accountable to those who were injured
by the violation."' Before attempting to apply the doctrine of impli-
cation to the antitrust laws, a closer examination of its scope and
limitations is necessary 113
109. Tindell v. Hardin, 337 F Supp. 563, 564 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In applying the maxim ubi
jus ibi remedium, the courts have been derisively referred to as "super draft boards,"
Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 380 (1955); super legal-aid bureaus, Uveges v. Penn-
sylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 450 (1948); super boards of education, McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948); and as super legislatures, Burns Banking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S.
504, 534 (1924).
110. 335 U.S. at 450 (citing R. PouND, V JURISPRUDENCE 441-50 (1959)). Legal scholars have
noted that the maxim ubt jus ibi remedium sprang from a later jurisprudential trend of
analyzing and classifying substantive rights before fashioning remedies. In both Roman and
common law systems, remedies or creation of causes of action came first.
111. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 412-19 (1964).
112. Arguments against the doctrine of implication stem from fear of a flood of litigation
caused by judicial activism, but as Justice Harlan countered in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), "Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly
scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on
this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes
of legally protected interests." Id. at 411. For the Court to make such a value judgment
concerning the relative importance of legal rights normally is a legislative judgment, which
traditionalists would reserve for Congress.
113. Implication must be distinguished from the related, but potentially confusing, con-
cepts of standing, federal common law, negligence per se, and the general rules of statutory
interpretation. The doctrine of standing to sue is founded in either the constitutionally man-
dated doctrine of justiciability or the rules of self-restraint adopted by the judiciary to prevent
unwise and excessive use of its power. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
Application of the doctrine of standing presupposes a cause of action and focuses merely on
whether those seeking to maintain a cause of action are affected sufficiently to be involved
in a "case or controversy" to justify the court's use of its powers on their behalf. Implication
involves a judicial search for the existence of a cause of action.
The doctrine of implication also differs from federal common law, which is based upon
legislative jurisdictional grants. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
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Ubi jus ibi remedium is not a general rule of statutory interpreta-
tion. Opponents to its general application have attempted to con-
strue it as merely an instrument for interpreting legislative intent."4
This is evident in the numerous times opponents of implication urge
application of the concept of statutory interpretation expresslo
unius est exclusw altertus to defeat implication in a legislative
scheme which includes limited private remedies."5 This phrase
means that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
another. If the doctrine of implication were merely a tool for inter-
preting legislative intent, the result would be denial of implied rem-
edies if a statute provided limited express remedies. The doctrine,
however, is based on judicial interpretation and springs from the
flexible role the judiciary has played in using private remedies to
solve public problems, a major contribution of Anglo-American jur-
448 (1957). Both are applications of the maxim ubt jus ibt remedium; the distinction, how-
ever, is m the source of the right. The common law right is judicially created; the implication
right springs from a federal statute. The federal common law derived from jurisdictional
grants has its only statutory basis in the general grant of jurisdiction to courts by a statute.
Courts that are actually developing common law, that is, a judicially created cause of action
without a statutory basis, have invoked the maxim of ubt jus ibi remedium. E.g., Daily v.
Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 176 (7th Cir. 1945). Development of federal common law is much more
imaginative than the application of the doctrine of implication. See Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (federal common law of nuisance).
The doctrine of implication is also related to but distinct from the concept of negligence
per se. In the seminal implication case, Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the
Supreme Court relied on the negligence per se analogy without attempting to distinguish it.
Implication and negligence per se have different theoretical bases and failure to distinguish
the two can only lead to confusion and undue restriction of implied remedies. Negligence per
se is based on the premise that reasonable men obey the law and one who fails to do so must
be negligent. In applying negligence per se, the court is adopting a presumptive standard for
an extant cause of action. The doctrine of implication, of course, involves the creation of a
cause of action from a statute that does not provide for one. Implication is broader in its
application than negligence actions that are the limited basis for application of the concept
of negligence per se. Additionally, the central point of negligence per se cases is the breach
of duty by the defendant. If implication of remedies were predicated upon negligence per se,
the existence of a duty would become the focus of the inquiry. The real source of the doctrine
of implication, ubi jus ibi remedium, is a right. Existence of a right instead of a duty is the
basis for implying a remedy, resulting in a more expansive role for the doctrine of implication
m American jurisprudence.
114. E.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
115. Some commentators have rejected its application absent a clear intention of the
legislature to provide a private remedy. E.g., W PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 36, at 191
(4th ed. 1971). This rejection misconstrues the basis of the doctrine. Implication is a judicially
created doctrine that examines legislative intent as part of the analysis but is not dependent
upon clear, positive legislative pronouncements for its legitimacy.
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isprudence."' If legislative intent to create a private remedy were
necessary before implication of a remedy, then the doctrine of impli-
cation would be superfluous. Judicial inquiry would be limited to
statutory interpretation. This would indeed be an anomaly because
the unreliability of statutory interpretation is a major reason the
doctrine of implication developed.117
Conceptual difficulties with the implication doctrine have caused
confusion in application. The doctrine of implication has a convo-
luted history of inconsistent application from Texas & Pac. Ry v.
Rigsby"5 to Cort v. Ash"9 and its progeny 120 Federal courts have
used the doctrine in determining that an implied right of action
exists under the Safety Appliance Act,"' the Railway Labor Act,'
the Securities Exchange Act,'2 the Communications Act of 1934,12'
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,'2 the Rivers and Harbors Act,'2'
the Wagner-Peyser Act,' 27 the fourth'2 and fifth'' amendments to
the Constitution, the Hill Burton Act,'30 the Patent Act,' 3 the Natu-
116. The genius of the common law always has been its ability to solve problems through
private remeAies rather than government regulation. W LiP.pN, THE GooD Sociary 268-73,
282 (1973).
117. See H. HART & H. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASic PROBLEMS N THE MAKING AND
APPUCATION OF LAw 135-38 (10th ed. 1958).
118. See note 106 supra.
119. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
120. E.g., Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977).
121. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
122. Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engmemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944)
(45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)); Burke v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1970) (45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970)).
123. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(rule 10b-5 S.E.C. Regulations).
124. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)).
125. Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (49 U.S.C. §
401 (1970)); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (49 U.S.C.
§ 1374(b) (Supp. V 1975)).
126. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970
& Supp. V 1975)).
127. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (29 U.S.C. §
49 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
128. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
129. Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978).
130. Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 291 (Supp. V 1975)).
131. LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F Supp. 301 (D. Conn. 1973); Arnesen v. Raymond Lee
Organization, Inc., 333 F Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (35 U.S.C. § 31 (Supp. V 1975)).
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ral Gas Act,'32 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.'33 Federal
courts have declined to find an implied remedy under numerous
federal laws including the Federal Motor Carrier Act,'34 and Small
Business Act,'35 certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act,'3'
criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 610,' s3 the Amtrak Act,'3 and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act.'3 1 Unfortunately, this overview con-
tributes little to an understanding of the doctrine of implication. An
examination of various federal decisions both granting and denying
implication is necessary in order to synthesize the holdings into a
framework for analyzing the application of the doctrine of implica-
tion to the antitrust laws.'40
132. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., Inc., 349 F Supp. 670
(D. Neb. 1972), affl'd, 486 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973). But see McClellan v. Montana-Dakota
Util. Co., 104 F Supp. 46 (D. Minn. 1952), affl'd, 204 F.2d 166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 825 (1953).
133. Kipperman v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 554 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1977) (39 U.S.C. § 3009
(1970)); Guernesy v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (Supp. V 1975)). But see Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
134. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (49 U.S.C. § 316 (1970)).
135. Royal Serv., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966) (15 U.S.C. § 631
(1970)).
136. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)(§ 14 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
137. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
138. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974).
139. Olson v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977) (43 U.S.C. § 1331).
140. In Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the United States Supreme Court
first enunciated the doctrine of implication. The case involved a suit to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained by a railroad worker who was injured while descending from a
railroad car. A defective "grab iron" or ladder rung broke, injuring the plaintiff. Failure to
provide secure grab irons violated § 2 of the Safety Appliance Act. The statute provided no
express remedy. The Court was offered no analytical structure for determining the existence
of an implied remedy but did note that the plaintiff would have a right of action regardless
of the statute. This suggestion of a common law basis for the action with a statutory duty
providing the standard of conduct is virtually synonymous with negligence per se. Other than
adding the previously quoted lofty rhetoric and analytically confusing the doctrine of implica-
tion with the concept of negligence per se, this original implication case contributed little to
the doctrinal underpinnings of implied remedies.
The Supreme Court next construed a federal statute as providing an implied private rem-
edy in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engmemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
Tunstall was an action by black union members against the union for discriminatory treat-
ment in violation of the Railway Labor Act. With even less discussion than was present in
Rigsby, the court held that the plaintiffs were asserting a right that was derived from a duty
imposed upon the union by the statute. This sparse, perhaps even simplistic, analysis was
adopted and refined by the lower federal courts.
1979] IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
In Kardon v. Natwnal Gypsum Co."' and Reitmetster v.
Rettmetster, " Judges Kirkpatrick and Learned Hand set forth an
analytical structure for determining the propriety of implying a
remedy which survived for approximately eighteen years before
being modified by the United States Supreme Court.' In Kardon,
Judge Kirpatrick wrote the most prolific implication opinion in
American jurisprudence. 44 The court in Kardon found, for the first
time, "'45 an implied remedy for damages under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule X-10b-5, which imple-
ments it. Noting that there was no provision for a private civil action
and citing only the Restatement of Torts' and Texas & Pac. Ry
v. Rigsby, 47 the court implied a private right of action for two alleg-
edly defrauded sellers of securities. The defendants urged that the
provision of express civil remedies under other sections of the Act
evidenced congressional intent to deny the remedy "I The court
rejected that argument. The simplicity of Judge Kirkpatrick's
analysis of implication is compelling:
[T]he right [doctrine of implication] is so fundamental and so
deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not expressly denied
the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly and
plainly [The issue is] whether an intention can be implied
141. 69 F Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
142. 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
143. See note 176 infra.
144. This case began an avalanche of private securities litigation. Federal courts have given
remedies to purchasers, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v.
Raytheon, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), and sellers, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec.
Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Emon v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), for violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). Courts have found other sections of the Securities Act to
provide implied rights of action. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) (15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)). As the Fifth Circuit
has noted, "[O]ne can scarcely find an issue of the advance sheets of the Federal Supple-
ment and Federal Reporter that does not contain an opinion on § 10(b)." Rekant v. Desser,
425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
145. But see Decker v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940). Deckert, which
preceded Kardon by six years, involved implication of a private right of action for injunctive
relief under the Securities Act of 1933.
146. "The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, makes the actor
liable for an invasion of the interest of another if; (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively
or in part to protect the interest." 69 F Supp. at 513.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 514.
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to deny a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally, by
virtue of basic principles of tort law accompanies the doing of the
prohibited act. In other words, in view of the general pur-
pose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision for
civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law
implies.'
Although the analysis in Kardon continues to effect securities liti-
gation,5 0 its influence over general implication analysis has waned
in the last five years.'"
In Rettmetster v. Rettmetster, "I the court addressed the issue
whether the Communications Act of 1934, 13 which imposed crimi-
nal liability on anyone who intercepted and published telephone
communications, also imposed civil liability through an implied
private right of action.' 5 In holding that an implied private right of
action existed, Judge Hand stated:
Although the Act does not expressly create any civil liability, we
can see no reason why the situation is not within the doctrine
which, in the absence of contrary implications, construes a crimi-
nal statute, enacted for the protection of a specified class, as
creating a civil right in members of the class although the only
express sanctions are criminal."'
The court founded its analysis on the Restatement of Torts"5 and
a line of cases based on the early English implication case, Couch
v. Steel."7 Although Rettmetster referred only to penal statutes as
a source for implied remedies, its analysis is compatible with the
straightforward implication analysis of Kardon in which the source
of the remedy was an agency regulation. Read together, these cases
149. Id.
150. The Supreme Court clearly addressed the problem of implied remedies in securities
cases in J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borah, the Court implied a remedy under
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78 n(a)). Borak is discussed more
fully in text accompanying notes 176-83 infra. Kardon has remained the touchstone of rule
lob-5 litigation. E.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 657 (7th Cir.
1973); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
151. E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See notes 216-23 infra & accompanying text.
152. 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
153. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
154. 162 F.2d at 694.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. See note 105 supra.
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strongly suggest that implication is a function of the judiciary,
which in the absence of express legislative intent to the contrary,
will provide a private remedy for those who have been injured by
breach of a federal statute:
Obiter dictum in Bell v. Hood,'S decided by the United States
Supreme Court a few months before Kardon, apparently influenced
both Hand and Kirkpatrick. In Bell, the plaintiffs were attempting
to bring an implied cause of action against agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for violation of their fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights.'59 The Supreme Court stated that "where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule* from the
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief."' 60 This attitude, that the federal courts
will do what is necessary to provide a remedy for those whose federal
rights have been violated, whether the source of the right is the
Constitution, an agency regulation, or a penal statute, initiated a
period of judicial activism that resulted in the judiciary involving
itself in many nonjudicial activities."6 ' This commitment to a rem-
edy is also the wellspring of a simple implication analysis that pre-
sumes an implied remedy. The "presumption analysis," appealing
as its simplicity may be, never has been completely adequate in
cases considering implication.6 2
158. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
159. The court in Bell v. Hood decided only the narrow issue whether the federal courts
had jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action for violation of an individual's fourth and fifth
amendment rights. Not until twenty-five years later did the Court finally decide that an
implied remedy for violation of one's fourth amendment rights existed. Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See note 193 infra.
160. 327 U.S. at 684.
161. See note 109 supra.
162. In a series of cases, Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246 (1951); McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 104 F Supp. 46 (D. Minn. 1952),
affl'd, 204 F.2d 166 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825 (1953); and T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United
States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959), decided under the Federal Power Act, the Natural Gas Act, and
the Interstate Commerce Act, respectively, the federal courts held that no private compensa-
tory action could be implied for violation of rate regulations. These cases departed from an
extension of presumption analysis, which permitted a judicially created remedy in the ab-
sence of an available administrative remedy. In all three cases, the courts refused to allow a
private remedy to recover past unreasonable rates even though the respective enforcement
agencies could issue only prospective orders. Two plausible explanations exist for this line of
cases. First, rate cases are anomalous among implied remedy cases because the concern over
inequality of rates between those who successfully litigate lower rates and those who do not
litigate at all results in rate cases traditionally being prospective in nature. All three of the
19791
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Primary jurisdiction analysis,'6 3 the application of which gen-
erally resulted in denial of implied remedies, developed apart
from, but was influenced by, the more promising presumption
analysis. This influence was underscored by the case of Fitzgerald
v Pan American World Airways.'4 The plaintiffs in Fitzgerald,
three blacks who alleged racial discrimination for the airline's
refusal to allow them to reboard a continuation of a flight, sought
to recover damages on an implied rule of action under the Civil
Aeronautics Act.' 5 Judge Frank, speaking for the court, expressly
adopted the presumption analysis of Reitmetster and found an im-
plied private cause of action for violation of the statute.'6
Absent clearly enunciated legislative intent to the contrary, this was
the predictable result of the presumption analysis. The most en-
lightening item in Fitzgerald was that the statute contained both
penal provisions and a prospective administrative remedy Judge
Frank rejected a proffered primary jurisdiction analysis that was
based on the presence of an administrative remedy Because the
basis of Reitmetster was a penal statute and the primary jurisdic-
tion cases construed a statute that contained a prospective adminis-
trative remedy, Fitzgerald demonstrated the continued viability of
presumption analysis.
At the time of the Fitzgerald decision, presumption analysis
reigned supreme. Obviously, if presumption analysis had remained
intact to date, it would have simplified the inquiry of this Article;
in its repeated application, however, the federal courts began to
develop the analysis into a functional one involving more detailed
inquiry 117 In several cases through the 1960's, the federal courts
statutory schemes provided express remedies for prospective relief. Second, the cases are
explainable as invocations of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
163. In T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959), the Supreme Court deemed
implied private actions and common law actions "incompatible with a statutory scheme in
which the courts have no authority to adjudicate the primary question in issue." Id. at 474.
This is not a necessary interpretation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction because a court
confronted with an issue within the expertise of an administrative agency can refer that issue
to the agency as part of the adjudicative process. E.g., Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-
Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 89 (1962). A detailed examination of the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion and its effect on the doctrine of implication is beyond the scope of this paper.
164. 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
165. 49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (repealed 1958).
166. 229 F.2d at 501.
167. This trend culminated in the full development of a functional analysis for implication
by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See notes 195-204
infra & accompanying text.
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gradually foreshadowed the development of a functional analysis by
supplementing the original simple presumption analysis with de-
tailed inquiries.
In Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 6 the district court implied
a remedy under section 404(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938.169 This is the same provision under which the court in
Fitzgerald implied a private right of action.7 0 The court noted the
presumption analysis of Fitzgerald"' but proceeded to make further
inquiry before declaring that a private right of action existed under
the statute. The court examined the purpose of the statute,7 2 en-
hancement of that purpose by a private right of action,' 3 the avail-
ability of state iemedies,11 and the effectiveness of administrative
relief.75 The result was the same as Fitzgerald, but the analysis was
more complicated. The inquiry in Wills was the beginning of a func-
tional analysis in which federal courts no longer automatically pre-
sumed the existence of a private right of action.
The trend toward a more complex analysis was a gradual one. In
the watershed securities opinion, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,' 6 the
United States Supreme Court made its most searching inquiry of
168. 200 F Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
169. 49 U.S.C. § 484(b), as amended by Act of Aug. 23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 404
(amended 1972).
170. See note 165 supra.
171. The court m Wills noted the following:
The rationale of the decision in Fitzgerald, supra, is that inasmuch as the
Civil Aeronautics Act makes it a Federal crime to violate its provisions the
case falls within the doctrine which permits treatment of a criminal statute as
creating a Federal cause of action in favor of members of the class for whose
protection the statute was enacted.
200 F Supp. at 363-64.
172. Id. at 364.
173. Id.
174. In rejecting the alternate choice of relegating the plaintiffs to a state court remedy,
the court in Wills stated as follows:
Of course, the alternative to a Federal cause of action for the aggrieved airline
passenger is to remit a plaintiff to his remedy in the State courts, based upon a
State-created cause of action. But this recourse would fall far short of effectuat-
ing the purposes of the Act. Left with a cause of action under State law for
breach of contract, a passenger would rarely be able to prove actual damage
commensurate with the wrong
Id. at 365.
175. Id. at 364. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief, but the court refused to grant
equitable relief because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust admimstrative remedies. Id. at 366.
176. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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implication up to that time. The Court did not refer directly to the
line of cases that formed the basis of presumption analysis'77 but
implied a private remedy under section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.'11 The Supreme Court's analysis consisted of
examining the statutory scheme,'79 the purposes of the legislation,' 0
and the effect of an implied private action on the statute's pur-
poses.'"' The Court rejected any limitation on the power of the fed-
eral courts to fashion the most appropriate remedy 182 Borak can be
read to support the principle that if a duty that affects the plaintiff's
interests is violated and damages can be proved, normal tort princi-
ples will support a damage recovery as readily as any other rem-
edy 183
Despite the apparent viability, with alterations, of presumption
analysis, other implication decisions during this same time forbode
difficulties for presumption's analytical structure in later cases.' 4 In
177. This is particularly curious because Kardon, a presumption analysiscase, was the first
implied damage action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although Kardon involved
an action under § 10(b) of the Act and Borak was concerned with § 14(a), presumption
analysis would have been applicable to the facts in Borak. The Court's failure to cite Kardon
may be explained by the fact that Kardon was only a district court opinion.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
179. 377 U.S. at 431.
180. Id. at 431-32.
181. Id. at 432.
182. Id. at 434-35.
183. A narrower reading of Borak is also possible. The unique composition of the federal
securities laws allows those who would limit the application of Borak a colorable argument.
Implication of a civil remedy from the securities laws can be justified on the limited basis
that the statute's language itself suggests such a remedy. Sections of the Federal Securities
Act provide that every contract made in violation of the act or the performance of which
would involve a violation is "void." E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-6-15
(1970). These sections allow a limited use of the Securities Act in private litigation. This
impression is reinforced by the 1938 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which provided that certain contracts should not be deemed void "in any action maintained
m reliance upon this subsection." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). Because this subsection makes
no express provision for private remedies, Congress assumedly contemplated the availability
of implied remedies under the Act.
184. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), demonstrates the grad-
ual trend toward a more complex implication analysis. In a case for damages brought by the
United States against the owners of sunken vessels for the cost of raising the vessels, the
Supreme Court implied a private right of action for damages under the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970), despite the presence of criminal (33 U.S.C. § 409)
and vessel forfeiture penalties (33 U.S.C. § 409). The Court, using the language of presump-
tion analysis and relying on the inadequacy of the express remedies in light of the purposes
of the statute, implied a remedy. Notably absent was the detailed inquiry characteristic of
the evolving functional analysis foreshadowed in Borak and Fitzgerald.
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decisions more reflective of traditional statutory interpretation with
its deference to the legislature than the doctrine of implication with
its basis of general judiciary powers,' 5 federal courts denied implied
private actions for damages under the Communications Act of
193986 and the Small Business Act.'17 Neither opinion exhibited any
sensitivity to the function of the doctrine of implication, and both
courts were satisfied with ending the inquiry after finding no con-
gressional intent to create an implied private right of action.' 8
The United States Supreme Court furthered the trend toward
corruption of presumption analysis in Natwnal R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Natinal Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak).'' Although
this decision involved an attempt to imply a private remedy for
injunctive relief instead of compensatory damages, the Court's re-
fusal to allow the implied remedy illustrates the tendency of courts
during the reign of presumption analysis to view the doctrine of
In Gomez v. Flonda State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969), a case granting
a private right of action to migratory farm workers under the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 49 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the continued viability, with
slight alterations, of presumption analysis throughout the 1960's. The court examined the
legislative history and language of the statute and regulations to determine if the migratory
workers had a vested right to be protected from violation of the regulations promulgated
under the statute. Once the court answered that question in the affirmative, it concluded that
"[this Act, its setting and the regulations call imperatively for implied remedies here if the
purpose of the regulations - the protection of migratory farm workers - is to be achieved."
Id. at 576.
185. See notes 141-49 supra & accompanying text.
186. Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 309 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1962) (47 U.S.C. §
315(a)).
187. Royal Servs., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966) (15 U.S.C. §§ 631-
647)).
188. In Daly, the court stated as follows:
[T]here is nothing to indicate the See. 315(a) of the Act we are considering was
intended by Congress to specifically benefit a special class of persons.
We hold that neither Sec. 315(a) of the Act in particular, nor the entire Act in
general, created or authorized the bringing of a private cause of action to recover
damages
309 F.2d at 85-86.
The court in Daly relied on legislative intent to determine whether the statute was intended
to protect the plaintiffs and whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.
The former is part of presumption analysis, and the latter is antithetical to it.
In Royal Services, the court was even more graphically concerned about congressional
intent stating, "We think had Congress intended to give a civil remedy it would have
done so, either by express provision or by clear implication. It did not do so in the Small
Business Act." 361 F.2d at 92.
189. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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implication as a conventional tool of statutory interpretation if the
court was inclined to deny the remedy In Amtrak,"' the National
Association of Railroad Passengers sought to maintain an implied
right of action under the Amtrak Act to enjoin Amtrak from discon-
tinuing certain rail passenger service. The Amtrak Act expressly
authorized the Attorney General to sue Amtrak for certain statutory
violations and permitted employees to maintain actions involving
a labor agreement. 9' Treating the doctrine of implication as nothing
more than a tool of statutory interpretation, the Court held that the
presence of other remedies invoked the ancient principle of statu-
tory interpretation, expressio unus est exclusto alterius. 1 2 In
denying an implied right of action, the Court limited itself to con-
ventional statutory interpretation. " ' Under presumption analysis,
the proper inquiry was whether a judicially created private right
of action would further the congressional purpose, not whether
Congress intended that there be one. Congressional intent was
probative only of whether the plaintiffs were protected by a duty or
included in a right created by the statute.
Inquiry into whether Congress intended to imply a remedy is
190. National Railroad Passenger Corp. is referred to as Amtrak.
191. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a).
192. 414 U.S. at 458. The Court also found an intention in the legislative history to preclude
private action.
193. This restrictive analysis in Amtrak is particularly frustrating when viewed in light of
an earlier Supreme Court case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
This case involved implication of a private action for damages against federal agents for
breach of the plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights. The major focus in the doctrine of implica-
tion is the rights of the plaintiff rather than the duty of the defendant, which is the focus of
negligence per se cases. Thus, analysis in statutory implication cases is coterminous with
analysis in implication of constitutional remedies. In Bivens, the Supreme Court used pre-
sumption analysis with a little window dressing to allow an implied right of action for dam-
ages under the fourth amendment. In Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, the Court recog-
nized that the doctrine of implication is not merely a tool of statutory construction.
The exercise of judicial power involved in Borak simply cannot be justified in
C terms of statutory construction The notion of "implying" a remedy,
therefore, as appliet to cases like Borak, can only refer to a process whereby the
federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally available judicial reme-
dies according to reasons related to the substantive social policy embodied in
an act of positive law
Id. at 403 n.4 (citation omitted).
Despite this positive statement of the special role of the doctrine of implication separate
from conventional statutory interpretation, Amtrak demonstrated that something more
definitive than presumption analysis and lofty rhetoric was needed to clarify the doctrine.
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particularly unavailing for any analysis of implication. The basic
premise underlying the search is that Congress intended to provide
an implied remedy This is a legal fiction. When an express civil
remedy is omitted, Congress most probably did not consider the
remedy at all, or if Congress did consider a remedy, it rejected one.",4
Perhaps the major failing of presumption analysis is that its
straightforward approach makes it easy to misconstrue. In the
hands of a court not inclined to imply a remedy, the analysis is
readily distorted. An inquiry into legislative intent to provide a
private remedy furnishes a hostile court with a ready excuse to avoid
implying a remedy
As the frequent relapses into traditional statutory interpretation
demonstrated, the federal courts needed more guidance in analyzing
the doctrine of implication than presumption analysis provided.
The culmination of the trend toward a more functional, detailed
implication analysis was Cort v. Ash,'9 5 which enunciated a four-
step inquiry to determine whether a remedy would be implied from
a statute. In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court refused to imply a
remedy for damages in favor of a corporate shareholder against cor-
porate directors for violation of a criminal statute prohibiting corpo-
rations from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential elec-
tors are to be voted for."'99 The relevant questions'97 posed by
194. Professor Prosser states that when legislators failed to mention a civil remedy, "they
either did not have the civil suit in mind at all, or deliberately omitted to provide for it." W
PROSSER, supra note 61, at 191.
195. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed 1976).
197. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously had fashioned a similar analysis
in denying implication under the Federal Trade Commission Act. In Holloway v. Bristol-
Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court of appeals phrased the test as containing
five relevant factors:
(1) a Federal statutory or constitutional prohibition against the acts com-
plained of; (2) inclusion of the defendant in the class upon which the duty of
statutory compliance has been imposed; (3) legislative intent to place the party
claiming injury within the ambit of the statute's protection or to confer a sub-
stantive benefit or immunity upon him; (4) injury or threatened harm proxi-
mately resulting from the defendant's breach of duty; and (5) unavailability or
ineffectiveness of alternative avenues of redress.
Id. at 989.
Despite this detailed functional analysis, the first court to imply a remedy under the
Federal Trade Commission Act did so by resorting to an analysis more akin to the presump-
tion analysis and cited Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents and J.. Case v. Borak as
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the Court were the following:
First does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law9 98
This more detailed analysis, though not as expansive as presump-
tion analysis, helps prevent corruption through unwarranted reli-
ance on conventional rules of statutory interpretation in determin-
ing whether a remedy should be implied. 9 ' Unfortunately, many
courts that have applied the Cort v. Ash test have refused to allow
an implied remedy20 while courts that have allowed implication
since Cort v. Ash have ignored the analysis.2o'
authority. Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976). The
proper test according to the court in Guernsey is whether "(1) the provision violated was
designed to protect a class of persons including the plaintiffs from the harm of which the
plaintiffs complain, and (2) it is appropriate in light of the statute's purposes to afford
plaintiffs the remedy sought." Id. at 586. The D.C. Circuit should not feel slighted because
the district court in Guernsey also ignored the Cort v. Ash functional analysis in favor of a
quasi-presumption analysis.
198. 422 U.S. at 78.
199. E.g., National R.R. Passenger Ass'n v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974). See notes 192-93 supra. The Supreme Court cited Amtrak as supportive of the
second factor in the functional analysis; the second factor in the Cort v. Ash analysis, how-
ever, simply made the presence of legislative intent to grant or deny a private remedy a
relevant factor in implication analysis. Justice Harlan's comments in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, help place the factor of legislative intent m perspective:
The contention that the federal courts are powerless to accord a litigant dam-
ages for a claimed invasion of his federal constitutional rights until Congress
explicitly authorizes the remedy cannot rest on the notion that the decision to
grant compensatory relief involves a resolution of policy considerations not sus-
ceptible of judicial discernment.
403 U.S. at 402.
Implication simply is not a process that reduces the judiciary to attempting to discern the
will of the legislature. Rather, implication is an exercise by the judiciary in selection of
traditional remedies available under an act of positive law.
200. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying unsuccessful tender
offeror implied right of action under § 14(e) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Securities
and Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-6); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977)
(injured employees denied right of action under Outer Continental Shelf Act).
201. E.g., Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976). See
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When the functional analysis of Cort v. Ash is read in light of its
origins from the presumption analysis developed in Kardon, Reit-
metster, Borak, and Bivens, an expansive reading of the doctrine of
implication is clearly justified, if not mandated. The four factors of
Cort v. Ash are not terminally rigid tests to be applied as exclusion-
ary criteria. These four factors should be part of the general inquiry
by the court to determine the precise substantive social policy em-
bodied in the legislation and whether traditional judicial remedies
are consistent with those policies. Legislative history is relevant to
this inquiry, but not controlling. What is controlling is whether the
substantive policies reflected by the legislation are compatible with
traditional judicial remedies. With the history of the doctrine of
implication firmly established and the analytical structure offered
by Cort v. Ash placed in its proper context, consideration of the
doctrine of implication to aid the antitrust laws is possible.
Despite express references to the compensatory nature and the
broad statutory language of the private antitrust laws, numerous
classifications of persons have been denied their compensatory
rights under the express antitrust remedy."2 Indirect purchasers,
employees, lessors, and others have been denied the right to be
compensated for their injuries. 13 This situation is precisely what the
concept of ubt jus ibi remedium was intended to remedy The tor-
tious nature of an antitrust action is well recognized.0 4 The origins
of the doctrine of implication in the law of tort make it particularly
suitable for application to antitrust cases. This conclusion is sup-
ported by applying the analysis of Cort v. Ash to the express private
antitrust laws.
Does the Statute Create a Federal Right in Favor of the Plaintiff?
Traditional implication analysis involves examining a statute sec-
tion to determine whether the section creates a federal right in favor
of the plaintiff.25 Federal courts have implied remedies by examin-
ing an entire statutory scheme to determine the plaintiff's right.2 1
note 211 tnfra.
202. See notes 46-59 supra & accompanying text.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1976);
Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F Supp. 310, 315 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
205. E.g., Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
206. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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Despite this, an implied remedy under the antitrust laws is a unique
situation.21 The antitrust laws are a matrix of duties and rights
combining the prohibition of the various liability sections with the
express rights for compensation under section 4 for "any person"
injured "by reason of" antitrust violations. The uniqueness stems
from the necessity of reading these statutory sections together. The
duties created for defendants by the liability sections carry with
them the implication that those who are injured by the violation
have a right to be compensated. Because the legislative history of
the general liability sections is sparse, an examination of the legisla-
tive history of section 4 of the Clayton Act answers the question
whether the statute creates a right in favor of any plaintiff. This
express remedy is as definitive a statement of whether the antitrust
laws create a right in plaintiffs as can be expected in any statutory
scheme. Only the causal language "by reason of' was intended to
limit the express remedy Thus "any person" injured by reason of
antitrust violations was intended to have a right of action for com-
pensation.
Congress apparently intended to create a general right in the
public to be free from antitrust violations and to provide a remedy
to all persons so injured. Whether a federal right created by the
antitrust laws protects any particular plaintiff requires an inquiry
into whether the person was injured by reason of an antitrust viola-
tion. This broad approach focuses on injury in fact.
In tort law, the plaintiff must introduce proof that forms a reason-
able basis for the conclusion that the conduct of the defendant more
likely than not was a substantial factor in the injury of which the
plaintiff complains .211 This proof of causation in fact often is con-
fused with the question whether the defendant should be legally
responsible for the injury The concept is referred to as the standard
of proximate causation 2 9 a limitation on recovery in negligence
actions.
Antitrust violations are intentional torts. The proper causation
standard for an intentional tort is similar to the standard used by
207. Implication under the securities laws is probably the most analogous application of
the doctrine of implication. Even with the securities cases, however, substantial differences
exist. See note 183 supra.
208. W PRossER, supra note 61, at 241.
209. Id. at 244.
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Judge Learned Hand in Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. 210
In Vines, Judge Hand rejected an indirect injury barrier holding
that the only relevant question under section 4 was the factual
existence of an injury caused by an antitrust violation. 2'
The only other standing limitation under the broad approach
authorized by the antitrust laws is the constitutional limitation of
justiciability12 and its concomitant standard of standing. Courts
must determine whether the plaintiff has a "particular concrete
injury 213 that gives him a "personal stake in the outcome" 214 of the
adjudication meeting the constitutional and judicially prudent re-
quirements of injury in fact. 215 If the plaintiff meets this standard
of injury in fact, then no restriction on maintaining an action re-
mains other than by policy reflected in the particular statute. As
previously indicated under the antitrust laws, the express policy
favors no further limitation.
Is There Any Indication of Explicit or Implicit Legislative Intent to
Create a Remedy?
The doctrine of implication is not a tool of statutory interpreta-
tion but rather a judicial doctrine based upon the unique position
of the judiciary to determine the necessity of an implied remedy
The second factor of the analysis in Cort v. Ash, the search for
legislative intent, ignores the doctrine's function. Implicit in the
search for legislative intent to create an implied remedy is that
Congress considered the feasibility of implied remedies at all. As
Professor Prosser observed, that presumption is erroneous. 26
In analyzing the application of implication under the antitrust
laws, that inquiry is superfluous. The legislative history reveals that
Congress intended to create a broad antitrust remedy If courts had
given the express remedy the breadth reflected in the statute's lan-
guage and legislative history, little need for an implied remedy
210. 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948). In an antitrust case, Judge Hand concluded that a sales
agent who lost an account to his employer's coconspirator in a market division scheme had a
legally cognizable remedy under the antitrust laws. Of course, the impact of this case was
short-lived with the development of the direct injury and target area tests.
211. Id. at 491.
212. See note 113 supra.
213. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
214. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
215. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732-40 (1970).
216. See note 194 supra.
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would exist. Congress intended any persons injured in their business
or property by reason of antitrust violations to have a remedy for
treble damages. Certainly, silence as to an implied remedy is insuf-
ficient to mitigate against the implication of an implied remedy for
compensatory damages.
Is it Consistent With the Purposes of the Legislative Scheme to
Imply Such a Remedy for the Plaintiff?
Given the broad topic of this Article, the existence of an implied
remedy under the antitrust laws, the consideration of this element
is difficult because it requires juxtaposition of the purposes of the
antitrust laws with the identity of the particular plaintiff to deter-
mine whether implying a remedy for that plaintiff is consistent with
the legislative purpose.217 The legislative history of the liability sec-
tions of the antitrust laws is relatively sparse. Its role has been
identified modestly by Congress as the "basic guardia[n] of our
free enterprise system." '218 The two purposes of the express private
remedy under the antitrust laws were to compensate for private
harm and to deter antitrust violators. The intent of the private
remedy was to make "available to the people, 2 19 particularly con-
sumers and "small men engaged in competition, 22  an antitrust
weapon. Debates over the private remedy provision revealed a
strong congressional interest in creating a meaningful remedy for
those injured by antitrust violations. 2 1
As the previous discussions reveal, 22 numerous classifications of
victims of antitrust violators go uncompensated because of the judi-
cial restraints placed on the broad express remedy An implied rem-
edy for nontreble damages would comport with the compensatory
policy underlying the antitrust laws. Without expressing any con-
cern for the antitrust victims, but apparently fearful of the ruinous
effects of an overbroad antitrust remedy, the courts have denied
compensation for alleged antitrust violations to corporate creditors,
217. This consideration also is relevant to a determination of whether the statute creates
a federal right in the plaintiff, the first element of the Cort v. Ash analysis. See notes 206-15
supra & accompanying text.
218. S. REP. No. 94-803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
219. 21 CONG. REc. 3146 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Reagan).
220. Id. at 3147 (remarks of Sen. George).
221. See notes 21-28 supra & accompanying text.
222. See notes 38-91 supra & accompanying text.
[Vol. 21:437
IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
general partners, shareholders suing in their own right, lessors, sup-
pliers, employees, patentees, franchisors, and indirect purchasers.223
If the alleged violations occurred and these victims in fact were
injured because of the violation, to allow these plaintiffs to recoup
their actual losses is consistent with the purposes of the legislative
scheme.
Is the Cause of Action One Traditionally Relegated to State Law?
The large body of decisional law formulated under the antitrust
laws in federal courts tends to diminish greatly the relevance of this
factor to the application of the doctrine of implication to the anti-
trust laws. Still, the major motivation for the invocation of the
doctrine of implication is the absence of an effective remedy for
those injured by violation of laws intended for their protection. Al-
though these antitrust violations clearly are not the type of injury
traditionally relegated to state law, if effective state law remedies
are available for the same injury, implication might be inappro-
priate.
Two possible types of state remedies exist, state antitrust laws
and state tort laws, which could provide a compensatory remedy to
antitrust victims. Closer scrutiny reveals these possibilities are illu-
sory In a broad review of state antitrust laws one commentator has
noted that they are not uniform and, on the whole, provide ineffec-
tive remedies.2
Certain business torts, such as intentional interference with a
business relationship, offer a potential compensatory remedy for
some antitrust victims. The cause of action centers on bad motive2
and is subject to the defense of privilege 28 and other technical limi-
tations that greatly reduce its effectiveness in remedying the injury
caused by antitrust violations. Clearly, these difficulties indicate
that an implied right of action offers a remedy more effective and
flexible than that provided by a purely state remedy
Other Considerations
Although an implied remedy under the antitrust laws is analyti-
223. See notes 49-59 supra & accompanying text.
224. Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. Ray. 653 (1974).
225. W PROSSER, supra note 61, at 927-28.
226. Id. at 933.
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cally sound, other considerations must be addressed as part of the
decision to adopt this approach. The Supreme Court has expressed
concern over the negative effects of a multiplicity of litigation that
might result from too broad an interpretation of section 4 of the
Clayton Act. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Californa 2 17 and
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 25 the Court noted that a broad interpre-
tatin of section 4 could result in duplicative recoveries, overcompli-
cation of the litigation, overburdening of the courts, and lack of
incentive for worthier plaintiffs. The decision in Illinois Brick
strongly emphasized the latter two problems. The history of litiga-
tion prior to Illinois Brick indicates these concerns are illusory under
traditional section 4 litigation. Litigation prior to Illinois Brick
greatly narrowed the law of standing. Under an implied antitrust
remedy, the standing limitation is stripped away Thus, past experi-
ence does not necessarily remove the concerns in this context.
Multiplicity of litigation is unlikely to result from implementa-
tion of the implied remedy Statutory attorneys fees and treble
damages presumably are effective incentives for the prosecution of
private antitrust actions. The absence of these incentives 29 in the
proposed implied remedy should make plaintiffs less likely to file
"strike suits" or otherwise pursue questionable liability cases. The
implied remedy is likely to be used only in cases in which liability
generally would be clearer than in many section 4 cases. One might
expect that in such cases, a section 4 case would be pending by one
or more traditional plaintiffs. Indeed, one expects that most actions
under this implied remedy would be pled in the alternative with a
section 4 treble damage claim. The obtuse nature of the standing
analysis under section 4 would seem to encourage that practice. If
used in the alternative, the implied remedy adds flexibility to the
litigation by allowing the courts to ascertain more accurately the
plaintiff worthier of recovering treble damages under a narrow
standing test while still compensating injured plaintiffs under the
implied remedy This is certainly more palatable than the current
practice of limiting the plaintiffs at the pleading stage.
227. 405 U.S. 251 (1971).
228. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
229. It is well established that in the absence of a statute or contract provision authorizing
recovery of attorneys fees, they are not awardable as an element of damage or cost item. E.g.,
Burgess v. Williamson, 506 F.2d 870, 877 (5th Cir. 1975); Wolf v. Cohen, 379 F.2d 477, 480
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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To the extent duplicative recoveries are a risk, care should be
taken to avoid them, but not at the expense of allowing injured
antitrust victims to go uncompensated.20 The courts can take neces-
sary steps to avoid duplicative recoveries by apportioning damages
at trial 31 or by prohibiting recovery for damages previously re-
covered in similar private litigation. Stronger measures than these
should not be used. The threat of duplicative recoveries should not
be employed to frustrate the strong compensation policy of Ameri-
can jurisprudence generally and the antitrust laws specifically
Fear of overburdening the courts is suggested by some to be a
specious reason for narrowing standing.2sz This fear is also a poor
reason for refusing to imply a remedy for previously uncompensated
antitrust victims. The rather uncomplicated analysis inherent in
the proposed implied remedy and the lack of section 4 type incen-
tives makes this concern even more speculative in the implication
context than it is in section 4 cases.
CONCLUSION
The four factors enunciated in Cort v. Ash are to be analyzed to
determine exactly the substantive social policy embodied in anti-
trust legislation and whether traditional judicial remedies are con-
sistent with those policies. As the previous discussion discloses, the
substantive social policy to be vindicated, compensation to hereto-
fore remediless antitrust victims, is consistent with an implied pri-
vate remedy for antitrust violations.
The history of the doctrine of implication reveals that a private
remedy should be readily implied if it is necessary to right a wrong.
Individuals have been injured by antitrust violations but denied
compensation for their injury because of policy considerations
230. One commentator discussing duplicative recoveries in the context of § 4 noted that
avoidance of duplicative recoveries is a sound policy consideration but denial of standing is
too blunt an instrument to promote this interest sensitively. Berger & Bernstein, note 17
supra, at 851.
231. See, e.g., Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667-68 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 929 (1975), accord, Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,
526 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
232. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cmi. L. REv. 450 (1970). In the opinion
of Professor Davis, "Opening the doors to anyone 'injured in fact' will not appreciably in-
crease the number of parties who seek to litigate. It will cause an enormous drop in the huge
volume of litigation in the federal courts about the complexities of the law of standing." Id.
at 471.
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mainly fostered by the treble damage provision of section 4 of the
Clayton Act. If some means exists to reconcile the policy considera-
tions in order to provide the excluded victims a remedy, it is incum-
bent upon the courts to find it. The doctrine of implication is such
a method. To continue to deny antitrust victims some compensatory
remedy because of concern over treble damages would be inconsist-
ent with the highest principles of American jurisprudence. As Chief
Justice John Marshall once stated, "The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the pro-
tection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury "231
233. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
